The appeal went very badly for us because the Lewes judge in his summing up said that I told the firemen that there was wood in the container which exploded and that I encouraged them to fight the fire. This is untrue and I believe it mislead the jury and the appeal court.

The judge also failed to mention in his summing up that I drew a site plan on a plastic white board for a fireman called Meik.  My drawing explained where all the hazards were.  I made it quite clear to Meik that the container was full of fireworks. This was very early on in the day and my youngest son was also with me at the time.  I also pointed out that the Gas store was located next door.

In court the prosecution produced a badly drawn, scribbled out plan of my site, drawn by someone else.  My QC did not challenge the prosecution on the falsification of evidence in court.

There is also the question of why the film was first given to us with 52 seconds at the end of the film removed.  Some months later, the solicitors got to see the original tape which showed the container exploding.  Stuart tells me that the sound has been removed.  Martin’s colleague has told Stuart that he has seen the film with the sound and you can clearly hear the firemen telling Wenbridge to leave the site.

Our HSE license allowed us to store 600kg of 1.3g and 20,000kg of 1.4g.  We also had a further license for the shop issued by East Sussex County Council Trading Standards allowing us to store additionally either 250kg of 1.4g, 100kg of 1.3g or 30kg of 1.1g.  This is all listed in the Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations 2005, a further thing that my QC failed to mention.   

Sally Fisher, the H.S.E. inspector, conducted an inspection on October the 11^th 2005, which was the first inspection of the site in six years, a clear breach of guidelines by H.S.E. Rodney Ash was the Sussex Police Explosives and Firearms expert who accompanied her. His job was to report to all emergency services including the Fire Brigade, which he failed to do.  Mr Ash did not appear in court due to a breakdown soon after the fire. 

I am unsure as to which year the Fire Brigade conducted an inspection but it was at my request. Two senior officers arrived on different days and I showed both of them around Marlie Farm and took them over to the Upper Lodge site.  A few weeks after this, the Uckfield brigade turned up in a tender. They also conducted an inspection of the site.  They advised me to contact the Lewes brigade and not them in the event of an emergency. 

The Fire Brigade produced risk cards for both sites but during the computerisation of the records, Marlie Farm was not entered into the system. Therefore no risk assessment or emergency action plan was held at the Fire Brigade HQ.  As Festival Fireworks we did possess our own Risk Assessments and Emergency Action Plan in our office, our Health and Safety Officer was refused entry and was therefore unable to give it to the Chief Fire Officer. His statement is available although he did not appear in court as part of my defence.

Judge Cook only allowed us to have a single expert as part of our defence and placed cost restrictions for his work.  This was later increased but we only had five months to put together a defence.  The prosecution had all of the experts that they wanted, free access to the public purse and two years to bring a case with over 200 hundred people working on it (hardly a fair case).

1.      No training was ever given to the Firefighters in dealing with explosives as is required when explosives are known to be stored in the area.

o        How can Martin and Nathan be held responsible for the deaths at the site and be condemned for not being forthcoming with information (which we dispute as we shall discuss later on) and yet the fire service not be taken to task for such fundamental failings as lack of training or information on dealing with a situation such as this? Is this not withholding information?

o        Why has there been no prosecution of the Head of East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service for failing his Team?

2.      Supposedly Jeremy Upton knew there needed to be a 600 metre exclusion zone around the site while the fire was raging but this was not put in place as required by law.

o        Why has he never been prosecuted for breaching regulations and putting lives at risk?

3.      Jeremy Upton knew fireworks are explosives (the only one who did on the night –or so it seems). He knew the container posed the greatest risk to life. He suggested emptying the container when he arrived on site and took charge of the situation.He ordered fire crews, including one of the victims, Jeff Wicker to set up a monitor to cool the container and yet in court he said that he did not know where Jeff Wicker was.

o        Why did he change his account of events?

4.      Martin and Nathan repeatedly told emergency services personnel to evacuate the site. Martin and Nathan understood the danger and tried to prevent the tragic events but the result was that the police were ordered to arrest Nathan Winter for trying to get people to leave.

o        Why did this happen while Nathan was trying to save lives? If the emergency services had listened to Martin and Nathan Winter, the loss of life could have been prevented.

5.      Fire crews from Lewes had reported a fault with the nearest hydrant to the site in June 2006 (6 months before the accident).

o        Why was this not rectified as soon as it was reported and why was the fire brigade not prosecuted for endangering life through negligence of their maintenance responsibilities?

6.      Risk Cards were produced for the two sites early in 2000. These were supposed to be put onto a computerised system but Marlie Farm was not.

o        Why was this? Was it ‘lost’ or was the site not considered a significant risk?

o        Without the risk card, the fire crew had no information about what to expect on the site and therefore were put at risk by the failings of the fire service. Why has this negligence not been investigated?

o        Why did no one in the emergency services check for national guidelines on how to deal with a ‘fire at a fireworks facility’ as per the readout from Dispatch? This is not the first firework fire accident.

o        Why was Brian Wembridge allowed on site with no personal protective equipment?

o        Why was he allowed to keep returning to the site after being told by 7 different firemen to leave?

o        If Mr Wembridge disobeyed orders why are Martin and Nathan being held responsible for his death?

7.      The company Martin and Nathan Winter ran had risk assessments and emergency action plans in place to give to the fire service in such an emergency.

o        Why was the company Health and Safety Officer prevented from entering the site, to hand over these plans, by a fire officer?

1.      It is the job of the Fire Arms and Explosives Manager, Mr Rodney Ash of the Sussex Police to inform all emergency services of any sites where explosives are stored. Mr Ash should have checked that the Fire Service was aware that the Site was on their system; Rodney Ash has since had a mental breakdown and was therefore unable to explain his actions in court.

o        How could such a failing be allowed to happen?

o        How has Rodney Ash not been investigated for his failings on that night?

2.      The Police said to Martin, Nathan and Nathan’s solicitor that if they gave up their business and moved away they would not proceed with any convictions.

o        How can the Police make such an ultimatum?

o        Is that how the police work in supposedly ‘serious crime cases’?

3.      On the day, as the fire was taking hold and it became apparent that there was not much anyone could do to stop the blaze, Nathan and Martin Winter tried to get the site evacuated. The resulting attitude from the police was to arrest Nathan.

o        How could this happen when Nathan was trying to prevent any loss of life?

1.      They inspected the sites on the 11^th October 2006 (2 months before the accident). This was the first time they had visited the site in 6 years. Guidelines say that they should make inspections at least once a year, maximum of 2 years for low risk sites (Marlie Farm was not a low risk site). The HSE only visited when Martin Winter contacted them to sort out a shop licence with Trading Standards.

o        Why did they fail to make any inspections between 2000 and 2006?

o        Why did the HSE not send any details of the sites to the Fire Brigade as per their requirement?

o        Why did the HSE not check that the Fire Brigade had an action plan in place for dealing with a fire on a site such as this?

2.      The HSE never held any training days in 2005 when new regulations on how to deal with explosive fires came into force. All fire fighters should have been notified and trained on these changes.

o        Why did this not happen?